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Gnawing at the Roots: 
Toward a Transpersonal Poetics of Guilt and Death   
As an imaginal approach, archetypal psychology focuses its attention on the diverse 
and polysemous expressions of imagination as the ground from which all psychological 
expressions emerge, replacing the dried up concept of a singular ego with the notion that 
consciousness takes up a multitude of styles concordant with the mercurial flow of images 
that concentrically influence, grip down, and take over consciousness like a band of pirates 
commandeering a ship. Archetypal psychology situates itself as a transpersonal psychology by 
qualifying the image as inextricably archetypal, denoting a valence of meaning that extends 
beyond the merely personal, beyond the particular cultural-historical situation, pointing 
toward a pattern that has persisted in the cultural and personal heritage of humanity since 
time immemorial. After a brief introduction to some of the primary ideas of archetypal 
psychology, this paper explores the Criminal as an archetypal image, complex, and shadow 
projection that has been culturally disavowed and expressed through the brutality of systemic 
racism. The paper concludes with an example of the transformation of this image through 
the psychological functions of guilt and death. 
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Psyche as Image
Archetypal psychology, one of the most influential and far-reaching extensions of Carl Jung’s work, begins with Jung’s (1929/1968) premise “image 
is psyche” (p. 50) His use of the word image here should 
not be confused with image as picture. Whereas the 
notion is certainly inclusive of the pictorial images we 
experience in dreams and reveries, an image is in no way 
limited to the visual. Sound, taste, touch, smell all arrive 
with the same kind of metaphoric possibility as a visual 
image. An image is not designated as such by its mode 
of sense perception or content; nor is an image limited to 
internal experience.1 Rather, an image is contingent on 
the way in which one approaches the phenomenon; that 
is a phenomenon is experienced as an image when it is 
approached through an act of imagining (Casey, 1974; 
Hillman, 2004). As Patricia Berry (1984) noted: 
The image may be a particular entity in a dream 
or a configuration in the dream, the dream in its 
entirety, the dream within a situation, symptom, the 
course of an illness, etc. The image is simply that 
upon which the work of crafting focuses as given 
and nonnegotiable. (p. 156)
The image comes unbidden, given and 
nonnegotiable, as both the spontaneous fantasy 
activity of the psyche and “the psyche itself in its 
imaginative visibility” (Hillman, 2004, p. 18)—the 
psyche as self-generative, creating itself by producing 
images. “We live immediately only in a world of 
images,” Jung (1933/1960) noted (p. 353). The dream, 
as a gathering of images, shows each night the way in 
which the image of the “I” lives as one image amongst 
many in a world of other images. Our basic human 
ground is psychic reality, or what Hillman (2004) 
called “the poetic basis of mind” (p. 18). We know 
experience through our dream of the experience—the 
nightdream, daydream, feeling, reverie, symptom, 
slip, gesture, desire, each image like a coiled spring of 
psychological significance, “a condensed expression of 
the psychic situation as a whole” (Jung, 1921, p. 442). 
“The image must rise again in the image.”
(Gospel of Phillip)
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A person's psychic images shape the particular 
kind of world they inhabit, demonstrating the intimate 
relationship between image and fate. Freud (1914) 
was able to articulate part of this relationship in his 
attention to the repetition compulsion—the way 
people repeatedly and compulsively live the image of 
their symptom, constricting their world to a small and 
miserable sliver of reality, a frozen style of interpreting 
self, other, and world. In his attempt to emphasize the 
way to extricate oneself from this painfully limited 
existence, Jung (1951) described “the psychological 
rule,” noting, “when an inner situation is not made 
conscious, it happens outside, as fate” (p. 71). Unlike 
Freud, Jung consistently emphasized the symptom as 
prospective, having a purpose, a teleology aimed at 
crafting oneself to be more robustly and distinctly 
oneself. His method for this kind of psychic crafting 
involved careful attention to his patient’s images and 
to areas of collapsed imagination, opening the image 
by listening to it differently. In approaching the psyche 
as image, Jung developed a therapy that centers on 
relating to images on their native ground: imagination. 
James Hillman took this strand of Jung’s work 
and articulated a highly differentiated imaginal mode 
of relating to the psyche. In placing image as primary, 
Hillman (1979a) approached psychological work with 
a poetic sensibility, attending to the meaning displayed 
through the concrete metaphors of the image. He 
noted, “Careful aesthetic elaboration of a psychic event 
is its meaning” (p. 135). The image means what it is 
and is what it means. As such interpretation, in the 
sense of decoding or uncovering the latent content, is 
unnecessary. The imaginal approach works in a style 
mimetic to, rather than interpretive of, the poetic speak 
of images. Rather than translating psychic experience 
into metapsychological concepts, abstract theories, or 
structural typologies, the psyche is addressed in its 
primary language. Like a poem, a painting, a play, 
a tree, a cat, the image, he noted, speaks through its 
presentation, its full gestalt, its “context, mood, and 
scene” (Hillman, 1977, p. 62). 
Hillman (1971) placed primary therapeutic 
importance on the qualitative differentiation of 
images, noting “for what else is individuation than 
a particularization of the soul” (p. 133). He regarded 
qualitative description, or aesthetic elaboration, as 
an important move toward understanding the poetic 
precision of the image, the way an image speaks its 
meaning through its presentational display. In taking 
up an imaginal approach, the language used to describe 
the image is understood as an expression inherent to 
the image itself—or as Jung noted “language itself 
is . . . an image” (Jung, 1939/1959, p. 160). As such, 
words are allowed to break free from the crust of 
literalism, allowed all overtones and undertones, all 
shades of ambiguity and nuance. Hillman (1977) wrote, 
“We can meet the soul in the image and understand it 
… through word play which is also a way of talking 
with the image and letting it talk” (p. 81); in granting 
the image total autonomy, Hillman argued, one gains 
access to a quality of generativity that he referred to as 
archetypal.
Archetypal Image
One of Jung’s (1934/1954) most celebrated contributions was his expansion of the notion 
of the unconscious beyond what he called Freud’s 
“personal unconscious” of repressed or forgotten 
contents (p. 3). Of course, Jung’s view of Freud was 
limited by his own complex relationship with his 
former mentor; however, this distinction served as a 
way for Jung to differentiate his psychology from the 
powerfully persuasive and encompassing psychology 
of Freud. Jung was adamant about the importance 
of developing a psychology and psychotherapeutic 
method that could account for the ways in which 
psychological experience extends beyond the personal. 
To this end, he focused his attention on what he 
called the collective unconscious, a dimension of the 
psyche  that is shared by all of humanity. Jung’s notion 
of the archetypal psyche posited an inborn “psychic 
substrate of a suprapersonal nature which is present 
in every one of us” (p. 4). The archetype as such 
stands outside consciousness, is essentially formless, 
analogous to Plato’s Idea and Kant’s noumenon. Jung 
(1938/1954) described the archetype as “a possibility 
of representation which is given a priori” (p. 79). The 
archetype is “irrepresentable” (Jung, 1921, p. 305)—
analogous to the axial system of a crystal, which has 
no material substance itself but preforms the material 
of the crystal into definite patterns. In the same way, 
Jung’s notion of the archetype is “empty” (p. 79), only 
made visible as an image. One never experiences the 
mother archetype as such, rather one experiences a 
mother image, a unique and idiosyncratic expression 
of a universal pattern.
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In an adaptation of Jung’s work, archetypal 
psychology pays less attention to the archetype, as noun, 
and makes more use of the archetypal, as adjective. 
Descriptors keep one’s thinking phenomenological, a 
preventative against reified thinking, the kind of thinking 
in which the archetype, a fundamentally unknowable and 
irrepresentable pattern, is reduced to something known 
and formulated. An archetypal perspective discloses the 
way an image “resonates with collective, trans-empirical 
importance” (Hillman, 2004, p. 23). The adjective—
archetypal—affords the most significant kind of value to 
the stream of psychological experience, in that it denotes 
a valence of meaning that extends beyond the merely 
personal, beyond the particular cultural-historical 
situation, the one-sidedness of the Zeitgeist, pointing 
toward a transpersonal, or universal, style of existence. 
Jung often wrote of the problems that arise 
from an unconscious relationship with the psychological 
expressions of archetypal patterns. “The gods have 
become diseases” Jung (1929/1968, p. 113) argued, and 
spent his career attending to the gods vis-à-vis symptoms, 
dream images, shadow projections, split off parts of 
personality, pervasive moods, flashes of feeling, and 
other such expressions of the psyche. He used his method 
of amplification to contextualize the image, to discover 
the psychological connections between the personal and 
the transpersonal, using associations to cultural history, 
mythology, religion, alchemy, the occult, and other 
features of humanity’s symbolic heritage. Amplification 
gave him an Archimedean point2  from which he could 
lift the heavy psychological conditioning of cultural 
constructions and developmental trauma.
The Criminal
Take the following example: A young man enters therapy and begins to give voice to his psychological 
experience. He recounts memories, shares his fantasies 
and dreams, his sighs, gestures, verbal intonations, 
silences. He yells, cries, breaths, thinks, avoids, shuts 
down, takes risks, and learns. In short he discloses his 
psychological world. In the mind of both therapist and 
client, patterns begin to cluster together. As he repeats 
and repeats, patterns become more differentiated—his 
basic wounds begin to show their true shape. He sees the 
ways he lives his life as if he were a criminal.  
The criminal arrives in a complete constellation 
of accompanying images—Law, Prosecutor, Defense, 
Judge, Jury, Police, Accomplices, Victims. Cruelty and 
punishment are expected and even inadvertently sought 
after. Defenses are made, and often. Everything is at 
stake, and the true crime is unknown. Guilt pervades 
as the dominant mood. Guilt colors his world, fertilizes 
his fantasies, each of which relentlessly reproduce scene 
after scene of crime, arrest, trial, prosecution, defense, 
judgment, and cruel punishment. Guilt blinds him to 
himself, blinds his imagination to imagining the way 
in which he is gripped by the criminal image.  
Like any image, his criminality is relational. 
He attributes his guilt to his failure at being the person 
people want him to be. Tragically, he breaks himself 
to live up to their expectations, but will always fail 
because he is attempting to conform to an enigmatic 
and protean Law that lives outside him. His repeated 
failures stoke a rage that lives inside his stomach, a 
fiery ulcer marking in flesh the point where trauma 
has eaten away his protective lining. The wound 
reminds him of his eternal punishment; pulses of 
hydrochloric acid vent up his esophagus, burning his 
chest, constricting his heart. Like the acid reflux, his 
anger boils to the surface, defending the innocence he 
knows is a lie. He is, as Rilke (1905/1996) noted, “a 
house gutted by fire” (p. 137).  
Amplifying the Image
Kafka’s (1925/1998) novel The Trial begins with, “Someone must have slandered Josef K., for one 
morning, without having done anything truly wrong, he 
was arrested” (p. 3). K. is in bed when the guards arrive, 
confine him to his room, and make his private world a 
spectacle. Utterly exposed under the watchful gaze of his 
landlord, his neighbors, and his co-workers who were, 
for no obvious reason brought in by the guards, K. sees 
himself through their eyes, finds himself thrown into a 
world of Guilt and Innocence; Defense and Prosecution. 
It matters little that he has done nothing wrong; his 
world has been arrested, ceased by the mood of guilt that 
has been projected into him. K. is in an inextricable bind 
because, as the guard noted, the Law does not seek out 
guilt but is “attracted by guilt” (Kafka, 1925/1998, p. 9). 
Therefore since he feels guilty, in this absurd and twisted 
logic, his arrest is perfectly reasonable.  
Later that evening, K. anxiously waits late into 
the night for his neighbor Fräulein Bürstner. When 
she returns to the boarding house he thoughtlessly 
ambushes her with a wild recounting of his arrest. K. 
acts with utter disregard for his neighbor, justifying 
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his harassment for the sake of demonstrating the tale 
of his suffering under the punishing Law. It is as if he 
is saying “You have no idea of the suffering I endure. 
If only you understood how much suffering I am in, 
you would understand why I am acting this way. You 
would throw your arms around me and love me back 
into a good place.” 
He frightens her with his disruptive account, 
and when he sees the fear written on her face, he 
takes her by the wrist and says “You’re not mad at me, 
are you?” Removing his hand, she replied, “No, no, 
I never get angry at anyone” (Kafka, 1925/1998, p. 
33). The Criminal, one might imagine, requires this 
kind of vindication; someone to give him solace. Just 
as Fräulein Bürstner, late at night, let K. into her room, 
allowing his needs to disrupt her world, reassuring his 
anxiety, the Criminal demands the sympathetic ear, 
requires the one person that will remind him of his 
innocence, his goodness, and his power.   
K. is not only blind to the way he is 
perpetuating the same kind of disturbance he endured 
in others, he also makes himself painfully ignorant to 
the implications of his own situation. Blinded by his 
rationalizations, he uses reasonable interpretations to 
keep himself calm when he is standing on the edge of 
an abyss. 
K. makes several comments about how little 
he cares about the trial and the possibility of a pending 
conviction. He comports himself like a petulant boy 
who has endured too many of his mother’s angry 
punishments. The boy, powerless and enraged, forces 
himself to take control of his facial muscles, ensuring 
his mother can see no sign of emotion. He hides away 
his hurt, knowing that if she knew she could hurt him, 
she knew she had power over him, a power she would 
use to force him to behave the way she wanted. The 
boy is punished, and no attempt is made to understand 
why he is behaving as he is. Without the mother’s 
understanding, the boy cannot understand himself. 
Punishments alone create very little opportunity to 
learn from experience. 
The national recidivism rate of 77% in 
the Unites States provides a nauseating piece of 
evidence for this argument. One might imagine that 
punishment evokes the criminal just as the criminal 
evokes the punishment. Possession by this archetypal 
constellation is passed down from parent to child vis-
à-vis the emotional ambiance of the child’s home and 
from systems to particular cultural groups vis-à-vis 
the culturally constructed designations of privilege 
and prejudice. The Equality and Human Rights 
Commission reported that in the United States a 
metropolitan police officer is “28 times more likely to 
use stop-and-search powers against Black people than 
White people” (Dodd, 2012). The U.S. Department 
of Justice reported that the number of Black men in 
prison or jail is five times higher than the number of 
White non-Hispanic men (Sabol, Minton, & Harrison, 
2007). 
This judicial discrepancy is a symptom of a 
cultural-wide projection of the Criminal as a shadow 
image, qualities that are rejected within oneself and 
relentlessly attributed to and evoked in the other. 
Jung (1938/1969) noted the heavy cost of this violent 
disavowal, arguing “the less it is embodied in the 
individual’s conscious life, the blacker and denser it 
is” (p. 76). The astounding number of police officers 
who have shot unarmed Black men, along with the 
myriad examples of systemic and explicit racism in the 
United States, demonstrates the double meaning of 
Jung’s statement: the “blacker” one is, the more one is 
forced to embody the shadow. 
The Alchemical Black
The use of the English term ‘white’ as an ethnic category and identity, first noted in the sixteenth 
century, arose out of racist presuppositions, allowing 
the privileged groups distance from the derogatory 
category of ‘black,’ the color attributed to Africans, a 
color the Christian world had long associated with evil 
(Hillman, 2004); other meanings of black going back 
to the fifteenth century have included “deeply stained 
with dirt; soiled; foul; malignant, atrocious, horrible, 
wicked; disastrous, baneful, sinister” (p. 84).  These 
associations all cluster together as shadow qualities—
“the thing a person has no wish to be” (Jung, 1946/1966, 
p. 262). Wish as one may, the qualities do not disappear, 
nor can one rid oneself of the shadow by projecting 
it into a marginalized group. The disavowed shadow 
tears through one’s most congenial self-presentation, 
disrupting asymmetrical fantasies, ethical values, and 
best intentions. 
The work of analysis involves a committed 
confrontation with the shadow. The psychic energy 
that leaks out through projection is contained in the 
alchemical vas of analysis, allowing an exploration of 
International Journal of Transpersonal Studies 55A Transpersonal Poetics of Guilt and Death
all the different shades of the psyche. From black to 
blue, to white, to red, the alchemical texts, so important 
to Jung’s depth psychology, described psychological 
transformation through a spectrum of different 
colors. The initial confrontation with the shadow was 
imagined as the stage of nigredo, or blackness, which 
involved taking the work through a series of dark and 
painful operations: mortificatio, putrefactio, calcinatio, 
and iteratio—death, decay, desiccation, and ceaseless 
repetition. 
A Dream 
I was walking through wild land with Elana. We 
stopped near a bush, standing side by side. There was 
a dead squirrel on the ground surrounded by a horde 
of flies. I was repulsed and didn’t want to look. The 
flies were thick in the air. I saw one fly land and find 
its way to the decaying body through the pile of flies. 
I really didn’t want to look. Elana picked up a short 
stick and began moving part of the squirrel’s body 
saying she wanted it to decompose faster. I thought she 
shouldn’t do that, or at least get a longer stick.
A Synchronicity
The next day as the dreamer walked out of his studio, 
he glanced over at the claw foot tub sitting outside 
his house. Noticing something unusual, he stopped 
and walked over, finding in the empty tub a squirrel, 
dead and rigid with rigor mortis. Pain gripped his 
heart as he carefully removed the squirrel from the 
bathtub and placed it amongst the trees surrounding 
his house, knowing that the resident animals would 
take the body and put it to use.   
The dream, dreamt by the same young man 
described above, offers several images, each displaying a 
different relationship to death. The dream ego is clearly 
repulsed by the scene; he wants to keep distance and 
not look; he finds himself sickened. Elana, unfazed, 
casually joins the flies, assisting the decomposition by 
fearlessly prodding the morass of decay. The fly wants 
nothing more than to find its next meal in the rotting 
flesh, no stick needed. The fly fights to be near the 
decaying body, the object of its desire. Like flies in 
waking life,  one might imagine this fly as driven to lay 
its larvae on the body of the dead squirrel—death, for 
the fly, is an essential gateway to life. 
One could assume that the dream ego holds a 
style of response that is analogous to the waking ego’s 
dominant attitude: death and decay evoke repulsion 
and should only be touched with a long stick, that is 
from a distance.  From his perspective, the short stick 
used by Elana brings her too close to the rotting corpse, 
too close to something that feels emotionally fraught 
and repulsive. Her short stick evokes fear. He would 
like her to back off or drop the matter all together. 
Look away, he repeats to himself. The dream image as 
a whole, however, opens possibilities of a more direct 
engagement with death, relativizes the ego’s one-
sidedness, his repulsion, looking away, and distancing, 
Patricia Berry (1982) wrote of “Layard’s Rule,” 
which she articulated as “Nothing in the dream is wrong, 
except perhaps the dream ego” (p. 83). This simple move 
quickly flips the dream, distances those imagining the 
dream from a limited identification with the attitude of 
the dream ego. The “perhaps” opens imagination to the 
possibility that the dream ego has a limited view, that 
the images he finds himself in relation to in the dream 
are not wrong; they belong to the “full democracy 
of the image” (Berry, 1982, p. 60), are produced, in 
precision, out of necessity. The single fly must land and 
visibly make its way through the mass of flies toward 
the rotting flesh. Its hunger for death, its thirst for rot, 
disturbing as they may be to the dream ego, is right: 
life feeds on death; death breeds life. In addition, 
Elana’s short stick approach complements the dream 
ego’s aversion. While he looks away, she moves closer to 
the death and decay that lies between them, the death 
that comes with closeness, with “standing side by side.” 
She illuminates the way close engagement involves 
taking apart the dead pieces, supporting the necessary 
transformation of death into life, something akin to the 
work of mourning in analysis.3
As noted above, medieval alchemists were 
well acquainted with the notion that the work of 
transformation requires an intimate relationship with 
death and rotting. Throughout the primary alchemical 
texts one finds frequent reference to nigredo as the 
first accomplishment in the work, a transformation of 
the prima materia, the basic material of psychological 
work, the symptoms, opaque fantasies, blind literalisms, 
and inchoate feelings—virginal and unworked. The 
nigredo blackens virginal consciousness through deep 
immersion in one’s psychological situation, a descent 
into psychic reality—lights out and you're inside, 
nothing to say, name, or categorize, no foresight, no 
insight, no hindsight, nothing but “the madness of 
space” (Stevens, 1977, p. 115); all is obscured, and 
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any hope would be “hope for the wrong thing” (Eliot, 
1943, p. 28).
Alchemy, like any transpersonal modality, 
unabashedly dissolves the split between subject and 
object, work and worker, writer and writing, both 
poles coalescing into what one might call “the Opus.” 
As the nigredo unfolds, the work is infused with 
images of death, any notion of objective distance ends, 
and the worker is pulled into a confrontation with the 
dark side of the psyche. Like the flies in the dream, 
the psyche requires death. As such, psychological 
alchemy begins with an ending; death is the door. The 
death, rotting, putrefaction, and fermentation of the 
nigredo are essential operations in transmuting one’s 
narrow and literalized perspectives into psychological 
experience, imbued with a polyphony of metaphorical 
significance.
Death and Guilt
The dreamer has, to use a gross understatement, struggled with death. At age 15, his father, dead 
from a liver rotted out by alcohol, was nothing more to 
him than a terrorizing presence he was glad to be rid of. 
He hated his father and saw that his father hated himself. 
After his father’s death the hatred was turned into his 
own form of self-hatred and guilt, punishing himself 
frequently with thoughts that cut like razors. 
The dreamer’s therapy ushered him into 
imagining the ways his guilt points to his transgressions, 
the way he tormented his mother with his acting out, 
his substance abuse, his disregard for the emotional 
strain he unwittingly placed on those close to him. The 
meaning he discovered in his guilt, however, extended 
beyond his need for accountability and reparation. His 
guilt became an affective link between himself and his 
father, allowing him to imagine what his father felt 
returning back from the deplorable violence of the 
Vietnam war; what he felt walking his vodka-soaked 
body through the door to his home and minutes later 
watching his wife hustle his two children into the car, 
leaving him quarantined; what he felt living in his car, 
jobless, broke, and alone; what he felt when he was told 
by his family that he had to go live near his sister, back 
to his hometown in a state far away; what he felt as his 
body began to swell with water, as his liver was slowly 
eaten by cirrhosis; what he felt in his dying moment 
when he undoubtedly thought of the family, the two 
children he would never see again. 
“Guilt,” Jung (1945) noted, “spreads itself 
over the whole neighborhood. A house, a family, even 
a village where a murder has been committed feels 
the psychological guilt and is made to feel it by the 
outside world” (p. 195). The veterans returning home 
from Vietnam are a primary example of just such a 
response. Guilt hit them from all sides; guilt for the 
violence they personally inflicted; guilt for surviving 
when many of their closest companions were killed; 
guilt in response to the antipathy of the anti-war 
activists and the neglect born out of a culture that had 
dissociated from the atrocities happening overseas. A 
multitude of biographies speak to the way in which 
upon returning home, the Vietnam vets became 
isolated in a claustrum of post-traumatic stress, left 
to quietly endure the psychological ramifications 
of a profoundly violent war. One Marine Corps vet 
recounted the following anecdote:
This one kid ran out toward the helicopter in the 1st 
Platoon, which was about five ahead of us, tossed a 
grenade and ran. As it exploded, a gunner in another 
ship shot the kid. The grenade killed the crew chief 
and gunner, and wounded both pilots. After you see 
that, what do you say? (Dean, 2010)
The culture-wide response to this question: “Say 
nothing.”
The guilt that accompanied the war trauma 
was devastating. But to whom does the guilt belong? 
The veteran? Surely he was complicit, but social 
traumas such as these are far too great for any one 
person. The lion’s share of guilt over Vietnam belongs 
to the culture as a whole; however, few cultural groups 
make space for the weight of war. The emotional 
burden is left on the shoulders of the soldiers and their 
families. War trauma spreads like a contagious disease. 
In his essay A Psychological View of Conscience, 
Jung (1958) made the following observation:
The psychoid archetype has a tendency to behave 
as though it were not localized in one person but 
were active in the whole environment. The fact 
or situation is transmitted in most cases though 
a subliminal perception of the affect it produces. 
(p. 452)
Jung was able to set aside the Cartesian 
presuppositions that stand in the way of imagining 
the porous nature of the psyche and the confluence 
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between the intersubjective and archetypal fields. In 
the example given, the guilt transmitted from the 
patient’s father unwittingly initiated him into his 
archetypal lineage, first connecting him to fantasies 
of his deceased father’s emotional experience, filling 
in the gapping lacuna left by his premature death. 
Second, it directed him to the archetypal core of the 
complex shared by father and son. Through the deeply 
personal experience of guilt, the patient gained access 
to a central thread of his transpersonal heritage, the 
weave of which wove together the disparate pieces of 
his traumatized psyche. 
One thread leads to a life lived as the criminal, 
averting his eyes from the decay of his values, avoiding 
the inextricable fact that he is what he is, choosing 
instead “every kind of self-deception if only he can 
escape the sight of himself ” (Jung, 1945, p. 203). 
Jumping over his own shadow, denying his own 
inferiority, he will undoubtedly spend his life indicting 
the world, “looking for every¬thing dark, inferior, and 
culpable in others” (p. 203). 
His heritage of guilt also opens a second 
possibility, an opportunity to confront the ways in 
which he, like all people, has failed, is failing, and 
will fail to live up to his own psychological values. 
Jung (1945) celebrated this function of guilt, noting, 
“If only people could realize what an enrichment it is 
to find one’s own guilt, what a sense of honour and 
spiritual dignity!” (p. 202). He added, “Without guilt, 
unfortunately, there can be no psychic maturation 
and no widening of the spiritual horizon” (p. 216). 
However, for guilt to widen one’s spiritual horizon, 
one has to widen the way the emotion is imagined, 
deepening into the personal implications to access 
the transpersonal meaning, the archetypal root of the 
emotional experience. Hillman (1979b) referred to 
this psychological move as epistrophe, or reversion—
connecting a personal experience or personality 
attribute back to its root metaphor in the archetype.
Kafka’s Trial demonstrates the absurd cruelty 
of a culture that has lost the transpersonal aim for 
the emotional experience of guilt. Guilt becomes a 
mechanism for blind adaptation to oppressive cultural 
mores rather than the opposite, an awakening to what 
each individual values most. To understand the full 
significance of the emotion, guilt requires transpersonal 
amplification. The psyche, because it is archetypally 
constituted, needs mythology to fully know itself. 
Myth is a mirror for the soul, reflecting the ways in 
which the most deeply personal experiences are at once 
transpersonal, reflecting both the soul of the individual 
and the soul of the collective, as well as the paradoxical 
sameness and difference between the two.
Because of this inextricable paradox, 
amplification is fraught with opportunities for 
misdirection and mistimed moves, the too familiar 
defenses of spiritual bypass (Welwood, 2000), intellec-
tualization, inflation, and reductionist interpretations. 
Moreover, amplification from a dream image to a 
symbol is often accompanied with an abstraction away 
from the emotional fervor and fecundity of the concrete 
image—the sharp edges,4  the astounding complexity, 
and always-unique weave of the dream context.5
Mythic figures are different from symbols 
in that they are never separate from their stories, the 
imaginal context that bespeaks who they are, where they 
are, and the company they keep. Symbols generalize 
an image to demonstrate collectivity and numinosity. 
Myths differentiate the gods and the relationships 
between gods and mortals, mirroring the complex 
differentiation of the psyche and the relationship 
between psyche and spirit. The particularities of the 
enigmatic images in myth evoke imagination, keeping 
one dreaming about their existence and the way of 
things in the world.    
Mythic images and dream images feed 
each other in a dialectic of image-making. The dual 
weave of myth patterns the dream image, broadens 
its context so it swells with mythic reference. In the 
dream cited above, for example, one might imagine 
the twice-repeated image of squirrel through the 
Norse mythology of Ratatoskr, the drill-tooth, a 
creature of communication who runs up and down 
Yggdrasil, the world tree, passing messages between 
the Eagle perched on top and Níðhöggr Wyrm, the 
dragon who lives at the bottom of the world tree 
incessantly gnawing at its roots and eating the bodies 
of men. Much could be said about Squirrel as medium 
between above and bellow, between air and earth, 
soaring and crawling, spirit and body, archetype and 
instinct. I will limit my associations, however, to the 
way in which the myth mirrors a particular piece of 
the dreamer’s psychological life.  
One morning before his therapy appointment, 
the dreamer opened his desk drawer, removed a ring, 
and placed it on his finger. The gold platted ring held a 
 58 International Journal of Transpersonal Studies Butler
red ruby at its center and was embossed with the words 
UNITED STATES MARINES. Atop the ruby is the 
Marine Corps insignia—the Eagle, Globe, and Anchor. 
The ring, which he had up to this point never worn, 
was inherited from his father, who wore it proudly 
throughout his life. Prior to that, the ring belonged to 
his mother’s uncle who fought and died in Iwo Jima.
The ring materialized a transformation of the 
invisible into the visible—his relationship to his father 
held in an image that he wore on his ring finger—a 
material correlate of a psychological accomplishment; 
the red ruby like the rubedo of the alchemist who 
has brought his work through the many stages of 
transubstantiation, reddened it into life, the eagle like 
the soaring spirit of transcendence, and the anchor like 
the stabilizing force of facticity; and like the squirrel 
that moves from ground to sky, from gnawing dragon to 
soaring eagle, the ring connects the dreamer to his own 
capacity to move between the two poles—the ceaseless 
gnawing of the guilty mind, chewing at the past and 
future, metabolizing events into experience, and the 
eagle-eye vision of spirit, eyes moving from ground to 
horizon, watching closely for what he values most.
Notes
1. The categories of internal and external, although 
used here, are clearly inadequate when discussing 
psychological experience, which unabashedly 
undercuts the distinction between internal/external, 
subject/object. As J. H. van den Berg (1972) noted, 
“Never do we see objects without anything else. We 
see things within their context and in connection 
with ourselves: A unity which can be broken only 
to the detriment of the parts” (p. 37). 
2. An Archimedean point is a theoretical vantage 
point from which one can observe the subject in its 
entirety—an objective perspective. Whereas pure 
objectivity, devoid of subjective presuppositions, is 
clearly a fallacious fantasy, a recalcitrant remnant 
of enlightenment era thinking, Jung’s amplification 
expands the limits of subjectivity, broadening 
imagination beyond the limits of the contemporary 
cultural and personal presuppositions.  
3. Analysis is derived from “ana: ‘up, throughout’ 
+ lysis ‘a loosening,’ from lyein ‘to unfasten’” 
(Harper, 2017a, n.p.). With this etymology in 
mind, one might imagine analysis as a loosening, 
unfastening the pieces of psychological experience 
to assist transformation. 
4. Seeing through to the basic expression of the 
psyche, one experiences the way the details of an 
image disclose an account of the psychological 
situation with scalpel-like precision. The image 
cuts through the ignorance of single-minded 
perspectives. 
5. The etymological root of the word context is 
“contexere from com- ‘together’ + texere ‘to weave, 
to make’” (Harper, 2017b, n.p.), suggesting that 
context weaves the image together—disclosing a 
constellation of patterns and relationships.   
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